In a dynamic model of sports competition, we show that when spectators care only about the level of effort exerted by contestants, rewarding schemes that depend linearly on the final score difference provide more efficient incentives for efforts than schemes based only on who wins and loses....

Managers of private entrepreneurial firms face obstacles in raising capital both in placing a value on a firm and conveying value to investors. These problems are exacerbated when the firm is small, has limited assets (except for human capital) and has yet to have a lead product. In such cases...

This paper empirically examines how CEO optimism affects earnings smoothing and earnings surprises. The main finding is that optimistic managers smooth earnings more than rational managers and are associated with smaller (in absolute value) earnings surprises. A possible theoretical explanation...

We survey the textual sentiment literature, comparing and contrasting the various information sources, content analysis methods, and empirical models that have been used to date. We summarize the important and influential findings about how textual sentiment impacts on individual, firm-level and...

Public firms provide a large amount of information through their disclosures. In addition, information intermediaries publicly analyze, discuss and disseminate these disclosures. Thus, greater public firm presence in an industry should reduce uncertainty in that industry. Following the...

We examine which independent directors are held accountable when investors sue firms for financial and disclosure-related fraud. Investors can name independent directors as defendants in lawsuits, and they can vote against their reelection to express displeasure over the directors’...

Companies can increase executive compensation by allowing dividends to be paid on unvested restricted stocks grants, also known as stealth compensation. Examining all S&P 500 firms over the period 2003–2007, we find that more than half of the dividend paying firms allow this practice. We look...

Building on archival, anecdotal, and survey evidence on managers׳ roles in accounting manipulations, I develop an agency model to examine the effects of a CEO׳s power to pressure a CFO to bias a performance measure, like earnings. This power has implications for incentive compensation,...

Prior research argues that a manager whose wealth is more sensitive to changes in the firm׳s stock price has a greater incentive to misreport. However, if the manager is risk-averse and misreporting increases both equity values and equity risk, the sensitivity of the manager׳s wealth to...

This study examines the causal link between a firm's leverage decisions and the characteristics of its CEO bonus plans. Results from a simultaneous equations model strongly suggest that highly levered firms are less likely to use return on equity (ROE) or ROE-based accounting performance...