We investigate whether patents that are jointly held by legally independent companies help sustain product-market collusion. We use a simple model of repeated interactions to show that joint patents can serve collusive purposes. Our model generates two testable predictions: when joint patents...

This chapter examines the economics of property rights and property law. It shows how the economics of property rights can be used to understand fundamental features of property law and related extra-legal institutions. The chapter examines both the rationale for legal doctrine, and the effects...

We present a selective survey of the economic theory of intellectual property rights. After a brief description of the institutional framework, we discuss policy objectives and some basic welfare tradeoffs in intellectual property design. We consider the extent to which social objectives can be...

In many settings, human beings are boundedly rational. A distinctive and insufficiently explored legal response to bounded rationality is to attempt to "debias through law," by steering people in more rational directions. In many important domains, existing legal analyses emphasize the...

The paper uses the findings of psychology, behavioral economics, and behavioral ethics to revisit three main related assumptions of the rational-choice approach to equity, by developing three main points: first, not only bad people try to circumvent the law; second, behavior depends on the...