Members of a shareholder meeting or legislative committee have greater or smaller voting power than meets the eye if the nucleolus of the induced majority game differs from the voting weight distribution. We establish a new sufficient condition for the weight and power distributions to be equal,...

In this paper we propose a new rule to allocate risk capital to portfolios or divisions within a firm. Specifically, we determine the capital allocation that minimizes the excesses of sets of portfolios in a lexicographical sense. The excess of a set of portfolios is defined as the expected loss...

Microgrids are defined as an area of electricity distribution network that can operate autonomously from the rest of the network. In order to achieve the best economic outcomes, the participants in a microgrid can benefit from cooperation in microgrid design and operation. In this paper, a...

The rapid expansion of the biofuel industry diverts a large amount of agricultural crops as energy feedstocks, and in turn affects farm land allocation, feedstock market equilibrium, and agricultural economic development in local areas. In this paper, we propose game-theoretic models that...

This paper investigates the usefulness of non-cooperative bargaining theory for the analysis of negotiations on water allocation and management. It explores the impacts of different economic incentives, of a stochastic environment and of varying individual preferences on players' strategies and...

The relevance of bargaining to everyday life can easily be ascertained, yet the study of any bargaining process is extremely hard, involving a multiplicity of questions and complex issues. The objective of this paper is to provide new insights on some dimensions of the bargaining process –...

The objective of this paper is to investigate the usefulness of non-cooperative bargaining theory for the analysis of negotiations on water allocation and management. We explore the impacts of different economic incentives, a stochastic environment and varying individual preferences on...

In an economic or social situation where agents have to group in order to achieve common goals, how can we calculate the coalitional rents of the agents arising from the coalition formation? Once we have formalized the situation via a TU-game and a network describing the economic structure, we...

An extension of the Shapley value for games in partition function form is proposed in the paper. We introduce a version of the marginal contributions for environments with externalities. The dummy property related to it is defined. We adapt the system of axioms provided by Shapley (A value for...

On several classes of n-person NTU games that have at least one Shapley NTU value, Aumann characterized this solution by six axioms: Non-emptiness, efficiency, unanimity, scale covariance, conditional additivity, and independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). Each of the first five axioms is...