This chapter reviews the theory of the voluntary public and private redistribution of wealth elaborated by economic analysis in the last forty years or so. The central object of the theory is altruistic gift-giving, construed as benevolent voluntary redistribution of income or wealth. The theory...

This chapter studies the theory of value of games with infinitely many players.Games with infinitely many players are models of interactions with many players. Often most of the players are individually insignificant, and are effective in the game only via coalitions. At the same time there may...

We study allocation rules that are robust to coalitional manipulation by transferring, merging, or splitting individual characteristics among coalition partners (e.g. merging or splitting claims in bankruptcy problems). Coalition formation is restricted by an exogenous network (a non-directed...

Mediation is a dispute resolution process whereby agents reach a mutually acceptable agreement among different proposals that satisfy a set of principles. This paper provides a natural way of coming to such agreements in claims problems. In our approach, mediation combines (i) a set of fair...

We study the formation of a ruling coalition in political environments. Each individual is endowed with a level of political power. The ruling coalition consists of a subset of the individuals in the society and decides the distribution of resources. A ruling coalition needs to contain enough...

In this paper, we evaluate the impact of Turkey's membership on EU voting. The aspects that we discuss are decision-making efficiency and the distribution of power in the EU's leading decision making body the Council of Ministers. We compare two alternative Council voting rules: those accepted...

Probabilistic measures of a priori voting power are useful tools to asses actors' influence on collective decision-making either for the purpose of designing a voting organ or to model particular policy cases. This paper makes an attempt to reduce a dynamic voting process into a cooperative...

We investigate the existence of consistent rules for the resolution of conflicting claims that generalize the Talmud rule but do not necessarily satisfy equal treatment of equal. The first approach we follow starts from the description of the Talmud rule in the two-claimant case as...

This paper explores the extent to which individuals trust, reciprocate, cooperate, and pool risk. We use a battery of field experiments containing the trust game, the voluntary contribution mechanism, and the risk-pooling game, which we apply in six capital cities in Latin America. A salient...

We study dynamic selection of governments under different political institutions, with a special focus on institutional "flexibility". A government consists of a subset of the individuals in the society. The competence level of the government in office determines collective utilities (e.g., by...