Mediation is a dispute resolution process whereby agents reach a mutually acceptable agreement among different proposals that satisfy a set of principles. This paper provides a natural way of coming to such agreements in claims problems. In our approach, mediation combines (i) a set of fair...

The pre-nucleolus is a popular egalitarian solution concept for cost-sharing games. A drawback of this concept is that an associated cost allocation often cannot be calculated in polynomial time. Therefore, it would be convenient to know whether the pre-nucleolus of a particular game coincides...

We consider an extension of minimum cost spanning tree (mcst) problems in which some agents do not need to be connected to the source, but might reduce the cost of others to do so. Even if the cost usually cannot be computed in polynomial time, we extend the characterization of the Kar solution...

This chapter reviews the theory of the voluntary public and private redistribution of wealth elaborated by economic analysis in the last forty years or so. The central object of the theory is altruistic gift-giving, construed as benevolent voluntary redistribution of income or wealth. The theory...

Altruism, giving and pro-social conduct, and reciprocity, are the basis of the existence and performance of societies, through their various occurrences: in families; among the diverse motives of the political and public sector; as the general respect and moral conduct which permit life in...

The equitable division of a joint cost (or a jointly produced output) among agents with different shares or types of output (or input) commodities, is a central theme of the theory of cooperative games with transferable utility. Ever since Shapley's seminal contribution in 1953, this question...

This chapter studies the theory of value of games with infinitely many players.Games with infinitely many players are models of interactions with many players. Often most of the players are individually insignificant, and are effective in the game only via coalitions. At the same time there may...

This survey captures the main contributions in the area described by the title that were published up to 1997. (Unfortunately, it does not capture all of them.) The variations that are the subject of this chapter are those axiomatically characterized solutions which are obtained by varying...

We provide new characterisations of the equal surplus division value. This way, the difference between the Shapley value, the equal surplus division value, and the equal division value is pinpointed to one axiom.

This paper starts from a classical fair division situation of allocating an object among a set of agents. The problem is studied from both a cooperative and a bankruptcy point of view, analyzing the fairness properties of the proposed solutions.