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Chapter 4. Reputations in Repeated Games
Mailath, George J.; Samuelson, Larry - In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications : …, (pp. 165-238). 2015
the equilibrium payoff of the long-lived player (demonstrating ex ante reputation effects) and to show that this lower … bound is asymptotically irrelevant under imperfect monitoring (demonstrating the impermanence of reputation effects). The … chapter continues by examining the (necessarily weaker) reputation results that can be established for the case of two long …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025455
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Reputation without commitment in finitely repeated games
Weinstein, Jonathan; Yildiz, Muhamet - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric … 11 (2016) 1, pp. 157-185
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011485708
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Learning with bounded memory in games
Monte, Daniel - In: Games and Economic Behavior 87 (2014) C, pp. 204-223
We study learning with bounded memory in zero-sum repeated games with one-sided incomplete information. The uninformed player has only a fixed number of memory states available. His strategy is to choose a transition rule from state to state, and an action rule, which is a map from each memory...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010931201
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Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring
McLean, Richard; Obara, Ichiro; Postlewaite, Andrew - In: Journal of Economic Theory 153 (2014) C, pp. 191-212
A repeated game with private monitoring is “close” to a repeated game with public monitoring (or perfect monitoring) when (i) the expected payoff structures are close and (ii) the informational structures are close in the sense that private signals in the private monitoring game can be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011043051
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Strategic information exchange
Rosenberg, Dinah; Solan, Eilon; Vieille, Nicolas - In: Games and Economic Behavior 82 (2013) C, pp. 444-467
We analyze a toy class of two-player repeated games with two-sided incomplete information. In our model, two players are facing independent decision problems and each of them holds information that is potentially valuable to the other player. We study to what extent, and how, information can be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049786
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Play it again : partner choice, reputation building and learning from finitely repeated dilemma games
Kamei, Kenju; Putterman, Louis G. - In: The economic journal : the journal of the Royal … 127 (2017) 602, pp. 1069-1095
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011750703
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Flexibility and reputation in repeated prisoner's dilemma games
Honhon, Dorothée; Hyndmann, Kyle - In: Management science : journal of the Institute for … 66 (2020) 11, pp. 4998-5014
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012390757
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Information asymmetry and reentry
Harasser, Andreas - In: Economics Letters 123 (2014) 2, pp. 118-121
We model a reputation game, in which a sequence of short-run players chooses if to interact with a long-run player …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010906382
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Reputation-concerned policy makers and institutional status quo bias
Fu, Qiang; Li, Ming - In: Journal of Public Economics 110 (2014) C, pp. 15-25
costs when the policy maker is subject to reputation concerns. Conservative institutions that thwart beneficial reform may …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010744253
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Behavioral aspects of arbitrageurs in timing games of bubbles and crashes
Matsushima, Hitoshi - In: Journal of Economic Theory 148 (2013) 2, pp. 858-870
This paper demonstrates the theoretical foundation that underlies the willingness of rational arbitrageurs to delay and reinforce the speculative attack. The key assumptions are that there is a small probability that arbitrageurs are behavioral and never time the market of their own accord and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010662403