We adopt a novel approach to explain why firms opt for or against CEO duality and the value implications of this choice. Exploiting the 2009 amendments to Regulation S-K, we provide unique evidence on the first-time disclosure of the reasons firms state for combining (separating) the roles of...

This study examines the impact of director tenure diversity on board effectiveness. We find that tenure-diverse boards exhibit significantly higher CEO performance-turnover sensitivity and that firms with tenure-diverse audit committees are less likely to experience accounting restatements....

We analyze the valuation effect of board industry experience and channels through which industry experience of outside directors affects firm value. We find that firms with more experienced outside directors are valued at a premium compared to firms with less experienced outside directors. We...

Boards of directors are intellectually interesting; the literature on boards has academic impact and there is substantial scope for this literature to have policy impact. I illustrate these points by combining a select review of the literature with evidence from a variety of data sets. Boards...

The well-established negative correlation between staggered boards (SBs) and firm value could be due to SBs leading to lower value or a reflection of low-value firms' greater propensity to maintain SBs. We analyze the causal question using a natural experiment involving two Delaware court...

Corporate governance is concerned with the resolution of collective action problems among dispersed investors and the reconciliation of conflicts of interest between various corporate claimholders. In this survey we review the theoretical and empirical research on the main mechanisms of...

While there is widespread concern that target CEO retention by a private equity acquirer can result in a lower premium for target shareholders because of the potential conflict of interest of the CEO, it is also possible that target shareholders could benefit from CEO retention because it can...