We consider a bilateral trading problem in which one or both parties makes relationship-specific investments before trade. Without adequate contractual protection, the prospect of later holdups discourages investment. We postulate that the parties can sign noncontingent contracts prior to...

This article develops the point that the problems associated with contractual holdup may justify legal intervention in theory, and the article relates this conclusion to legal intervention in practice. Contractual holdup is considered for both fresh contracts and for modifications of contracts....

Le secteur agroalimentaire subit à l?échelle mondiale une transformation remarquable. Ce processus s?accompagne d?un recours accru à la contractualisation, qui suscite des préoccupations concernant la transparence du marché, les conséquences possibles pour les acteurs de la filière...

Contracts are a key tool for vertical co-ordination, enabling dialogue and capacity building across levels of government. They are frequently used for regional development policy in OECD and non-OECD countries. Drawing on contract theory and a variety of national experiences, this paper...

We examine a chain of sequential losses: an agent causes a loss to another, which triggers a loss to a third, and so forth. Our objective is to redistribute the losses fairly, taking into account that the chain turns "victim" to "injurer" in its subsequent step. This opens up for many...

When losses caused by one agent onto another triggers losses to a third, "victim" turns into "injurer" in the chain's subsequent steps. Should agents be responsible for the direct loss they cause or also bear some of the indirect losses they trigger? Through an axiomatic approach, we...

This paper discusses the possibility of applying the insights provided by the doctrine of the just price to the current debate about contractual justice. After summarizing the just price doctrine and addressing the objections traditionally raised against it, the paper identifies the role that...

Why are contracts incomplete? Transaction costs and bounded rationality cannot be a total explanation since states of the world are often describable, foreseeable, and yet are not mentioned in a contract. Asymmetric information theories also have limitations. We offer an explanation based on...

Using data from SEC filings, I show that the typical bank loan is renegotiated five times, or every nine months. The pricing, maturity, amount, and covenants are all significantly modified during each renegotiation, whose timing is governed by the financial health of the contracting parties and...

In this paper, we consider the tenure choice problem under different schemes of legal tenancy protection. We analyze the interaction between the rental and resale housing markets under conditions of bilateral asymmetric information regarding housing quality and the type of residents. Home...