To explore damage rules’ deterrent effect, we use a public good experiment to tailor allowable punishment to rules used in actual civil litigation. The experimental treatments are analogous to: (1) damages limited to harm to an individual litigant, (2) damages limited to harm to a group...

The Past, Present and Future of Comparative Law and Economics / Giovanni B. Ramello -- Markets, Contracts, and Firms: A Unified Model of Organizational Choice / Thomas J. Miceli -- Law, Social Norms, and Standards: Their Nexus with Government and their Impact on the Economic Performance of...

no abstract available.

This article provides the first empirical analysis of punitive damages in securities arbitrations. Using a data set of over 6,800 securities arbitration awards, we find that claimants prevailed in 48.9 percent of arbitrations and that 9.1 percent of those claimant victories included a punitive...

Multiple studies find that plaintiffs who lose at trial and subsequently appeal are less successful on appeal than are losing defendants who appeal. The studies attribute this to a perception by appellate judges that trial courts are biased in favor of plaintiffs. However, at least two...