<Para ID="Par1">Equivalent characterizations of multi-portfolio time consistency are deduced for closed convex and coherent set-valued risk measures on <InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$L^{p}({\varOmega,\mathcal{F},\mathbb{P}; \mathbb{R}^{d}})$</EquationSource> </InlineEquation> with image space in the power set of <InlineEquation ID="IEq2"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$L^{p}({\varOmega,\mathcal{F}_{t},\mathbb{P};...</equationsource></inlineequation></equationsource></inlineequation></para>

Set-valued dynamic risk measures are defined on <inline-formula id="ILM0001"> <inline-graphic xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:href="rquf_a_781668_o_ilm0001.gif"/> </inline-formula> with <inline-formula id="ILM0002"> <inline-graphic xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:href="rquf_a_781668_o_ilm0002.gif"/> </inline-formula> and with an image space in the power set of <inline-formula id="ILM0003"> <inline-graphic xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xlink:href="rquf_a_781668_o_ilm0003.gif"/> </inline-formula>. Primal and dual representations of dynamic risk measures are deduced. Definitions of different time consistency properties in the set-valued framework are given. It is shown that the...

In this paper we consider continuity of the set of Nash equilibria and approximate Nash equilibria for parameterized games. For parameterized games with unique Nash equilibria, the continuity of this equilibrium mapping is well-known. However, when the equilibria need not be unique, there may...