Our trust in competition policy is based on faith in markets. <p> When markets are oligopolies, already classical economists’ trust in <p> competition busted: Oligopolies carry the seeds of collusion. To develop, <p> collusion needs trust between firms. But new leniency programmes are <p> designed to bust...</p></p></p></p>

We show that when the researcher’s (observable but not contractible) contribution <p> to innovation is crucial, a covenant not to compete (CNC) reduces e.ort and profits <p> under both spot and relational contracts. Having no CNC allows the researcher to <p> leave for a rival. This alleviates a...</p></p></p>

We analyze firms’ incentives to cluster in an industrial district to benefit from <p> reciprocal technology spillovers. A simple model of cumulative innovation is presented <p> where technology spillovers arise endogenously through labor mobility. It is <p> shown that firms’ incentives to cluster are...</p></p></p>

In financing start-up firms, venture capitalists carefully select among alternative projects, design incentive compatible financial contracts and support portfolio companies with value enhancing managerial advice. This paper considers how venture capitalists can induce self-selection among...

The paper analyses the extent of and the reasons behind limits to competition policy <p> harmonisation in EU enlargement. Our focus is on vertical restraints. First, we <p> compare the relevant legal regimes towards vertical agreements in the EU and in <p> Eastern Europe. We then describe competition...</p></p></p>

Asymmetric information and fear of acquiring a 'lemon' may explain the paucity of foreign investment in emerging market economies. If investors are uncertain about the profitability of investments, intrinsically inefficient, temporary partnerships or joint ventures may serve as mechanisms...

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