In this paper we contribute to the study of how democracy works when politicians are better informed than the electorate about conditions relevant for policy choice. We do so by setting up and analyzing a game theoretic model of electoral competition. An important feature of the model is that...

This paper considers geometric ergodicity and likelihood based inference for linear and nonlinear Poisson autoregressions. In the linear case the conditional mean is linked linearly to its past values as well as the observed values of the Poisson process. This also applies to the conditional...

A strong representation of a committee, formalized as a simple game, on a convex and closed set of alternatives is a game form with the members of the committee as players such that (i) the winning coalitions of the simple game are exactly those coalitions, which can get any given alternative...

We investigate experimentally the effects of corrupt experts on information aggregation in committees. We find that non-experts are significantly less likely to delegate through abstention when there is a probability that experts are corrupt. Such decreased abstention, when the probability of...

An effectivity function assigns to each coalition of individuals in a society a family of subsets of alternatives such that the coalition can force the outcome of society’s choice to be a member of each of the subsets separately. A representation of an effectivity function is a game form with...

The increasing serial cost sharing rule of Moulin and Shenker [Econometrica 60 (1992) 1009] and the decreasing serial rule of de Frutos [Journal of Economic Theory 79 (1998) 245] have attracted attention due to their intuitive appeal and striking incentive properties. An axiomatic...

The concept of coalition proof Nash equilibrium was introduced by Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston [1987]. In the present paper, we consider the representation problem for coalition proof Nash equilibrium: For a given effectivity function, describing the power structure or the system of rights of...

Solutions for cooperative games with side-payments can be manipulated by merging a coalition of players into a single player, or, conversely, splitting a player into a number of smaller players. This paper establishes some (im-)possibility results concerning merging- or splitting-proofness of...

An economy with two dates is considered, one state at the first date and a finite number of states at the last date. Shareholders determine production plans by voting — one share, one vote — and at ?-majority stable stock market equilibria, alternative production plans are supported by at...

A social choice correspondance is strongly implementable if there is a mechanism such that its strong Nash equilibrium outcomes coincide with the alternatives chosen by the social choice correspondance. It is known that a strongly implementable social choice correspondence is contained in the...