The paper analyzes the process of market selection of investment strategies in an incomplete market of short-lived assets. In the model understudy, asset payoffs depend on exogenous random factors. Market participants use dynamic investment strategies taking account of available information...

This paper studies an application of a Darwinian theory of portfolio selection to stocks listed in the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA). We analyze numerically the long-run outcome of the competition of fix-mix portfolio rules in a stock market with actual DJIA dividends. In the model...

Studies in political science and psychology suggest that voters' perceptions of political positions depend on their personal views of the candidates. A voter who likes/dislikes a candidate will perceive his position as closer to/further from his own than it really is (projection). Clearly these...

This paper gives a definition of adaptive learning for extensive form games and provides sufficient conditions for convergence points of adaptive learning sequences to be sequential equilibria.

The paper studies a game of common interest played infinitely many times between two players, one being aspiration driven while the other being a myopic optimizer. It is shown that the only two long run stationary outcomes are the two static equilibrium points. Robustness of long run behaviour...

This paper develops and compares two theories of strategic behavior of professional forecasters. The first theory posits that forecasters compete in a forecasting contest with pre-specified rules. In equilibrium of a winner-take-all contest, forecasts are excessively differentiated. According to...

This paper proposes a general incomplete information framework for studying behavior in strategic games with stepwise (viz. `level-k' or `cognitive hierarchy') thinking, which has been found to describe strategic behavior well in experiments involving players' initial responses to games. It is...

We show that there is a unique correlated equilibrium, identical to the unique Nash equilibrium, in the classic Bertrand oligopoly model with homogenous goods. This provides a theoretical underpinning for the so-called "Bertrand paradox" and also generalizes earlier results on mixed-strategy...

It is an old ida in game theory that the justification of Nash equilibrium as a prediction of actual play in a game is that each player by imagining himself in the positions of his opponents will be able to figure out what these other players will play, and consequently the player himself will...