The strategic commitment moves that game theory predicts players make may sometimes seem counter-intuitive. We therefore conducted an experiment to see if people make the predicted strategic move. The experiment uses a simple bargaining situation. A player can make a strategic move of committing...

This paper provides an axiomatic characterization of a family of so-called efficient maxmin solutions which can be seen as generalizations of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution to nonconvex n-person bargaining problems. Moreover, it is shown that even though there are several efficient maxmin...

This paper analyzes monetary exchange in a search model allowing for multilateral matches to be formed, according to a standard urn-ballprocess. We consider three physical environments: indivisible goods and money, divisible goods and indivisible money, and divisible goods and money. We compare...

A matching and bargaining model in a market with one seller and two buyers, differing only in their reservation price, is analyzed. No subgame perfect equilibrium exists for stationary strategies. The authors demonstrate the existence of inefficient equilibria in which the low buyer receives the...

For n-person bargaining problems the family of proportional solutions (introduced and characterized by Kalai) is generalized to bargaining problems with non-convex payoff sets. The so-called "efficient proportional solutions" are characterized axiomatically using natural extensions of the...

The ideas behind the bargaining set (Aumann & Maschler, and Mas-Colell) as a solution concept are formalized. An alternative to the Mas-Colell bargaining set is defined and characterized.

In the present paper a generalization of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution to nonconvex n-person bargaining problems is provided. The generalization is obtained by a slight weakening of the axioms used in Kalai-Smorodinsky (1975) and Roth (1980).

The paper considers various cooperative equilibrium/solution concepts for atomless exchange economies. A famous result states that in such economies the core is equal to the set of Walrasian equilibria. We consider two arguments against using the core as solution concept in large economies: (1)...

We investigate experimentally the effects of corrupt experts on information aggregation in committees. We find that non-experts are significantly less likely to delegate through abstention when there is a probability that experts are corrupt. Such decreased abstention, when the probability of...

We study the effects of reputation and competition in a stylized market for experience goods. If interaction is anonymous, such markets perform poorly: sellers are not trustworthy, and buyers do not trust sellers. If sellers are identifiable and can, hence, build a reputation, efficiency...