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Corruption in Committees: An Experimental Study of Information Aggregation through Voting

Morton, Rebecca; Tyran, Jean-Robert - Økonomisk Institut, Københavns Universitet - 2014

We investigate experimentally the effects of corrupt experts on information aggregation in committees. We find that non-experts are significantly less likely to delegate through abstention when there is a probability that experts are corrupt. Such decreased abstention, when the probability of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010929078

Public Goods and Voting on Formal Sanction Schemes: An Experiment

Putterman, Louis; Tyran, Jean-Robert; Kamei, Kenju - Økonomisk Institut, Københavns Universitet - 2010

The burgeoning literature on the use of sanctions to support public goods provision has largely neglected the use of formal or centralized sanctions. We let subjects playing a linear public goods game vote on the parameters of a formal sanction scheme capable both of resolving and of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008546994

Production in Incomplete Markets: Expectations Matter for Political Stability

Crès, Hervé; Tvede, Mich - Økonomisk Institut, Københavns Universitet - 2009

In the present paper we study voting-based corporate control in a general equilibrium model with incomplete financial markets. Since voting takes place in a multi-dimensional setting, super-majority rules are needed to ensure existence of equilibrium. In a linear-quadratic setup we show that the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005225438

Do People Make Strategic Moves? Experimental Evidence on Strategic Information Avoidance

Poulsen, Anders U.; Roos, Michael V. M. - Økonomisk Institut, Københavns Universitet - 2009

therefore conducted an experiment to see if people make the predicted strategic move. The experiment uses a simple bargaining …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005749599

Bargaining Sets with Small Coalitions

Schjødt, Ulla; Sloth, Birgitte - Økonomisk Institut, Københavns Universitet - 1990

to definition of new solution concepts. (1) leads to the 'bargaining set' (two different definitions are considered in … the bargaining set is not an equilibrium concept, but a concept demanding either equilibrium or 'no equilibria one step … away', and that the bargaining set, in contrast to the core, is very sensible to the exact definition. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005818479

Eating Behavior and Social Interactions from Adolescence to Adulthood

Corrado, Luisa; Distante, Roberta - Økonomisk Institut, Københavns Universitet - 2012

This paper analyzes the importance of social ties for eating behavior of US youth. We propose a novel approach that addresses identification of social endogenous effects. We overcome the problem of measuring the separate impact of endogenous and contextual effects on individual Body Mass Index...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010555486

Stable Voting Procedures for Committees in Economic Environments

Keiding, Hans; Peleg, Bezalel - Økonomisk Institut, Københavns Universitet - 1999

A strong representation of a committee, formalized as a simple game, on a convex and closed set of alternatives is a game form with the members of the committee as players such that (i) the winning coalitions of the simple game are exactly those coalitions, which can get any given alternative...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005543493

On the Continuity of Representations of Effectivity Functions.

Keiding, Hans; Peleg, Bezalel - Økonomisk Institut, Københavns Universitet - 2003

An effectivity function assigns to each coalition of individuals in a society a family of subsets of alternatives such that the coalition can force the outcome of society’s choice to be a member of each of the subsets separately. A representation of an effectivity function is a game form with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005749525

Decreasing Serial Cost Sharing: an Axiomatic Characterization

Hougaard, Jens Leth; Østerdal, Lars Peter - Økonomisk Institut, Københavns Universitet - 2007

The increasing serial cost sharing rule of Moulin and Shenker [Econometrica 60 (1992) 1009] and the decreasing serial rule of de Frutos [Journal of Economic Theory 79 (1998) 245] have attracted attention due to their intuitive appeal and striking incentive properties. An axiomatic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005749538

Representation of Effectivity Functions in Coalition Proof Nash Equilibrium: A Complete Characterization

Keiding, Hans; Peleg, Bezalel - Økonomisk Institut, Københavns Universitet - 1999

The concept of coalition proof Nash equilibrium was introduced by Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston [1987]. In the present paper, we consider the representation problem for coalition proof Nash equilibrium: For a given effectivity function, describing the power structure or the system of rights of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005749558