The bulk of acid depositions, which have harmful effects on the environment, are caused by foreign emissions in many European countries. Therefore, if some countries emit more acids, one cannot be sure that countries that emit less will benefit from reduced acid depositions. However, numerical...

We study an international climate agreement that assigns emission quotas to each participating country. Unlike the simplest models in the literature, we assume that abatement costs are affected by R&D activities undertaken in all firms in all countries, i.e. abatement technologies are...

This paper explores water pricing policy in Tegucigalpa, the capital of Honduras, in a political economy perspective. I argue that current water prices are too low and significantly below long-run marginal cost, and demonstrate that water prices must be raised significantly over the next ten...

In the case emission of non-uniformly dispersed pollutants such as SO2 the negative effects depend on the location of the sources. A unit increase at one source must be compensated by either a lareg or smaller reduction at another source to keep the negative effects at the same level. Such trade...

We discuss three state-preference approaches to eliciting willingness to pay (WTP) for environmental goods, namely open-ended contingent valuation (OE-CVM), conjoint analysis (CA) and multi-attribute utility theory applied to decision panels of experts (EDP).

The RAINS model is used to calculate cost minimising abatement policies subject to European-wide spatial restrictions on pollution. The principle for choosing environmental targets for the 1994 Oslo Protocol was closing a gap between benchmark- and critical loads for each grid with a uniform...

This paper studies a game between a group of countries that have agreed to participate in an international climate agreement ( the signatories) and OPEC. The purpose of the signatories is to design carbon taxes that maximize their total net income, given a goal on global carbon emissions. As...

When a monopolistic hydro producer interacts with a competitive thermal fringe, the short-run revenue function of the hydro monopolist is non-concave. This implies that even if the demand function is stationary, equilibrium prices may fluctuate through the year. For given capacities, both hydro...

The purpose of this study is to identify the impact of a unilateral Norwegian carbon tax on the profitability and the the exit probability in 12 carbon-intensive manufacturing sectors.