We introduce a fast and inexpensive method to rule out potential barriers to adopting a technology. We use this method to asses the role of exogeneous contract enforcement as a barrier to market for Kenya's French Bean export market. We survey 240 farmers in Kirinyaga County, Kenya who were...

This research examines the effect of risk and time preferences on forest management responses to forest tenure land reforms in Fujian, China that began in 2002. The different extent of the reform and its different timing across regions provide a natural experiment to test how time and risk...

Reduction of carbon emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) has been identified as a cost effective element of the post-Kyoto strategy to achieve long-term climate objectives. The success of REDD depends primarily on the design and implementation of a financial mechanism that...

In recent years, educators and economists have experimented with a number of innovations to improve academic outcomes of students in developing countries. Providing cash rewards to students based on academic achievement may be a cost effective approach to achieve the goal. However, psychologists...

The need to provide agricultural information to farmers has led to emergence of numerous ICT-based MIS projects in developing country. These projects aim at promoting commercialization of smallholder agriculture and subsequently their welfare. This study examines the welfare effects of one such...

This paper examines the role of institutional environments on cotton farmer technical efficiency scores in Benin, Burkina Faso, and Mali using a stochastic frontier production approach. First, the key institutional changes that have occurred with the recent market-oriented reforms are discussed....

Replaced with revised version of paper 07/28/11. Former title: Indirect Effects of Microfinance: A Field Experiment on Formal Savings Expansion and Informal Safety Nets of the Ultra-Poor

This paper is based on our ongoing joint work with Ravi Kanbur. Xi Chen is grateful to Ravi Kanbur for invaluable comments, guidance and encouragement. For comments and suggestions, please direct correspondence to Xi Chen at xc49@cornell.edu.

This paper provides experimental evidence of the economic impact from shifting bargaining power in relational contracts. I implement an experimental design that adjusts the bargaining power of sellers (agents) and the enforceability of the contract. I find that the vast majority of contracts...