Showing 1 - 8 of 8
A concern for any program that offers payment for environmental services is that those services be additional. Non-additional services are those that would have been provided without the payment. One source of non-additionality is farmer misrepresentation of their pre-program management. Farm...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011068556
Selected Poster for AAEA 2014 annual meetings
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011068561
This paper considers four alternative policies for controlling harvest within a fishery: (1) individual limits without a permit market, (2) individual limits with a permit market, (3) a collective limit with individual decisions, and (4) a collective limit with collective decisions. We focus on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011068629
Abstract This paper studies the interaction between index insurance market and the rural credit market by investigating how the availability of index insurance affects borrowers' moral hazard behavior. Among different types of moral hazard problem in the credit market, we focuses on credit...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010916040
Dairy managers today are faced with the decision to either raise their own replacements on the dairy farm or send heifers to a custom heifer grower. The largest potential challenge of contracting out the heifer raising enterprise revolves around the potential for a moral hazard problem because...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005523049
This paper employs a cost function analysis method to investigate the existence of moral hazard in cotton buy-up insurance. The trans-log cost function estimates of the own-price elasticity of fertilizer, herbicide, and insecticide is -0.222, -0.143, and -0.121, respectively for Mississippi...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005012585
This paper uses a principal-agent model to examine incentive compatibility in the presence of information asymmetry between the government and individual producers. Prior models of livestock disease have not incorporated information asymmetry between livestock managers and social planners. By...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005476998
Utilizing ordered logit we examine the presence of two kinds of asymmetric information-adverse selection (intertemporal variability) and moral hazard (interspatial and/or residual variability) as revealed by the choice of optional units in Federal crop insurance utilizing Risk Management...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005320306