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Information Aggregation and Beliefs inExperimental Parimutuel Betting Markets

Koessler, Frédéric; Noussair, Charles; Ziegelmeyer, … - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung … - 2007

We study sequential parimutuel betting markets with asymmetrically informed bettors, usingan experimental approach. In one treatment, groups of eight participants play twenty repetitionsof a sequential betting game. The second treatment is identical, except that bettors are observedby other...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866873

Laboratory Bilateral Gift Exchange:The Impact of Loss Aversion

Dittrich, Dennis; Ziegelmeyer, Anthony - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung …

The employment relationship is characterized by incomplete contracts. Labor contracts often take the form of a fixed wage without explicit performance incentives meaning that workers have a large degree of discretion over effort levels. As a consequence, an employee’s general jobattitude...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866697

Causes, consequences, and cures of myopic loss aversion -An experimental investigation

Fellner, Gerlinde; Sutter, Matthias - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung … - 2005

Myopic loss aversion (MLA) has been established as one prominentexplanation for the equity premium puzzle. In this … investment flexibility seems to be at least as relevant asfeedback frequency for the effects of myopic loss aversion. When …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866865

Fair Wages and the Co-Employment of Hired and RentedHands- An Experimental Study –

Alewell, Dorothea; Friedrich, Colette; Güth, Werner; … - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung …

? Fairness norms mightplay an important role in wage-setting decisions. We will explore theoretically and experimentallypossible … fairness considerations of the involved parties. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866944

Effective equity experiences from an ultimatum experiment

Güth, Werner; Kovács, Judit - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung …

Fairness like other social norms is usually stabilized by punishing norm deviations. Reward uncertainty, however … experiment determines endogenously whether unfair offers are detected andsanctionable. In our experiment a proposer and a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866948

(Un)Reliable Concessions in Static andDynamic Bargaining Experiments

Fischer, Sven; González Morales, Luis G.; Güth, Werner - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung … - 2005

A two-persons bargaining problem often consists of initially incompatible demands that can be unilaterally reduced by sequential concessions. In a 2 x 2 x 2-factorial design we distinguish between reliable and unreliable concessions, between a static and dynamic settings and between symmetric...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866602

Inequality Aversion in Ultimatum Gameswith Asymmetric Conflict Payoffs

Fischer, Sven - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung … - 2005

. Overall, observed behavior gives rise to a context dependent interpretation of inequality aversion and to Knez andCamerer …'s 1995 observation that subjects form `egocentric assessments of fairness'. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866680

Strategic Delay and Rational Imitation in the Laboratory

Ziegelmeyer, Anthony; Boun My, Kene; VERGNAUD, JEAN; … - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung …

This paper investigates market failures due to strategic delays. We test experimentally a discrete model of dynamic investment, where two privately informed agents have an option to invest at the time of their choice in the presence of waiting costs. The equilibrium outcome of ourexperimental...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866694

Cooperative Networks: Theory and Experimental Evidence

Pantz, Katinka; Ziegelmeyer, Anthony - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung …

the results of two experiments. The ¯rst implemented environmentfollows the standard procedures for the voluntary … suf-¯cient to induce cooperative outcomes. In the second experiment we introduce the pairwisecommitment mechanism and we … observe aggregate cooperation rates beyond those observedin the ¯rst experiment whatever the monitoring cost but also beyond …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866705

“One Man, One Dollar”?Examining the equalization argument in support ofcampaign contribution limits

Vanberg, Christoph - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> - Abteilung … - 2005

Arguably the most important campaign finance regulations in U.S. federal elections are limitsimposed on the amount that an individual or organization may donate to a federal campaign. Suchcontribution limits are advocated on two separate grounds. The first is that they prevent corruption,the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866710