This booktraces the origins of GSEs, contrasts investor-owned and cooperative GSEs, and examines such issues as activities and the quality of oversight.

This booktraces the origins of GSEs, contrasts investor-owned and cooperative GSEs, and examines such issues as activities and the quality of oversight.

The authors argue that TV regulation should be based on the same principles used for print media, for which control of editorial content lies in private hands rather than the government.

The authors address claims that vertical ownership ties reduce programming diversity, restrict entry of competitors to cable, or have other socially undesirable effects.

The authors consider whether any special circumstances justify departure from free trade in telecommunications equipment.

This book applies new advances in economic theory regarding the asymmetry of information between firms and their regulators to the design of improved telecommunications regulation.

This book calculates the deadweight loss caused by the inefficient method of taxation that the Federal Communications Commission has employed and describes an alternative method.

The author explores periods of rapid technological change for coincidences of widening inequality and slowing productivity growth.

This book revisits the critical period of unbridled competition between the Bell System and independent telephone companies early in this century.