We present a model in which some of the firm’s information (“newâ€) can be disclosed verifiably and some information (“typeâ€) cannot, to show that some firms may voluntarily withhold good news and disclose bad news. We describe an equilibrium in which high-type firms...

Facilitation of Competing Bids and the Price of a Takeover Target Abstract Initially uninformed bidders must incur costs to learn their (independent) valuations of a potential takeover target. The first bidder makes either a preemptive bid that will deter the second bidder from investigating, or...

We provide a model in which irrational investors trade based upon considerations that are not inherently related to fundamentals. However, because trading activity affects market prices, and because of feedback from security prices to cash flows, the irrational trades influence underlying...

An unresolved issue in empirical research on corporate control is the extent to which takeovers improve target and bidder firm value. We provide estimates of value improvements that avoid the bidder-revelation bias present in previous studies. Our approach, the intervention method, is based on a...

The model examines the underlying spot market determinants of hedging and risk premia. The analysis takes into account spot market clearing, quantity and price variability, stock market portfolio opportunities, diverse output distributions of producers, demand and supply shocks, and supply...

An informational cascade occurs when it is optimal for an individual, having observed the actions of those ahead of him, to hollow the behavior of the preceding person without regard to his own information. Among the phenomena that can be explained by informational cascades are conformism at...