We show that the negative impact of financial crises on trade is magnified for destinations with longer time-to-ship. A simple model where exporters react to an increase in the probability of default of importers by increasing their export price and decreasing their export volumes to...

This paper assesses the effects of insurance and capital requirements on assets' equilibrium returns in a capital-asset-pricing model in which intermediaries possess better information than the public about the yields on a set of assets. Equilibrium returns depend on two risk premiums that...

Remarks by Eric S. Rosengren, President and Chief Executive Officer, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, at the Boston University conference on The State of Financial Reform (panel on Lessons Learned from the Global Financial Meltdown), February 28, 2011, Boston, Massachusetts

Keynote remarks by Eric S. Rosengren, President and Chief Executive Officer, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, at the Stanford Finance Forum, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, June 3, 2011

Remarks by Eric S. Rosengren, President and Chief Executive Officer, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, to the Financial Stability Institute, Bank for International Settlements, St. Petersburg, Russia, May 24, 2011

Remarks by Eric S. Rosengren, President and Chief Executive Officer, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, at The Sasin Bangkok Forum on "Asia in Transformation", Bangkok, Thailand, July 9, 2012.

This paper explores the question of whether market participants could have or should have anticipated the large increase in foreclosures that occurred in 2007 and 2008. Most of these foreclosures stem from loans originated in 2005 and 2006, leading many to suspect that lenders originated a large...

We review the period of the Latin American debt crisis in order to draw policy analogies from that experience for current U.S. credit securitization markets. During the earlier episode the Brady Plan used a zero-coupon U.S. Treasury security to provide a credit enhancement for the troubled...

We document the fact that servicers have been reluctant to renegotiate mortgages since the foreclosure crisis started in 2007, having performed payment-reducing modifications on only about 3 percent of seriously delinquent loans. We show that this reluctance does not result from securitization:...

The current financial crisis has given rise to a new type of bank run, one that affects both the banks' assets and liabilities. In this paper we combine information from the commercial paper market with loan level data from the Survey of Terms of Business Loans to show that during the 2007-2008...