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Incentives and Careers in Organizations
Gibbons, Robert - 1996
This paper surveys two related pieces of the labor-economics literature: incentive pay and careers in organizations. In the discussion of incentives, I first summarize theory and evidence related to the classic agency model, which emphasizes the tradeoff between insurance and incentives. I then...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012473133
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On fund manager incentives
Eichberger, Jürgen - 1994
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000507121
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The boundary of the firm in a model of trade within a hierarchy
Levy, Nadav (contributor) - 2003 - [Elektronische Ressource]
-world multidivisional firms: Operative decisions are in the hands of middle managers who are rewarded with incentive contracts based on the … performance of their units; Managers' decisions are subject to approval and intervention by the top management of the firm; and … managers are better informed regarding the affairs of their divisions than their superiors in the firm's hierarchy. In this …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002200406
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A model of myopic corporate behaviour with efficient stock markets and optimal management incentive contracts
Garvey, Gerald - 1996
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000947853
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On relative performance contracts and fund manager's incentives
Eichberger, Jürgen - 1997
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000975773
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Managerial Value Diversion and Shareholder Wealth
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye - 2000
managers. We question this view within its own analytical framework by studying, in a principal-agent model, the effects of … diversion overlooks a significant cost of such behavior. Many common modes of compensation can provide managers with incentives …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471137
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Performance Incentives Within Firms : The Effect of Managerial Responsibility
Aggarwal, Rajesh K. - 1999
executive officers. However, firms are run by teams of managers, and a theory of the firm should also explain the distribution …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471450
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Risk Perceptions, Board Networks, and Directors' Monitoring
Ding, Wenzhi; Chen, Lin; Schmid, Thomas; Weisbach, … - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2021
What makes independent directors perform their monitoring duty? One possible reason is that they are worried about being sanctioned by regulators if they do not monitor sufficiently well. Using unique features of the Chinese financial market, we estimate the extent to which independent...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012585458
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The Allocation of Authority in Organizations : A Field Experiment with Bureaucrats
Bandiera, Oriana - 2020
We design a field experiment to study how the allocation of authority between frontline procurement officers and their monitors affects performance both directly and through the response to incentives. In collaboration with the government of Punjab, Pakistan, we shift authority from monitors to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012479257
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Who’s Paying Attention? Measuring Common Ownership and Its Impact on Managerial Incentives
Gilje, Erik P. - 2019
We derive a measure that captures the extent to which overlapping ownership structures shift managers' incentives to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012479596