We study the investment of a telecommunications incumbent in quality and in cost reduction when an entrant can use its network through unbundling of the local loop. We fi?nd that unbundling may lower incentives for quality improvements, but raises incentives for cost reduction. Therefore, it is...

In this article we discuss the role of cable television networks and their ownership structure, in promoting competition in the local access market. An upgraded cable network can o¤er telecommunication services, and therefore can compete with the public switched telephone network. First, we...

We study the impact of access regulation in a telecommunications market on an entrant?s decision whether to invest in a network or ask for access when the regulator cannot observe its potential demand. Since the entrant has incentives to not compete vigorously right after entry in order to...

In this article, we analyze the product differentiation decision of a downstream entrant that purchases access to a bottleneck input from one of two vertically integrated incumbents, who will compete with him in the downstream market. We develop a three-stage model, where first an entrant...

In Portugal, fixed telephony was liberalized in 2000. In this article, we estimate the impact on prices and consumer welfare of the liberalization process. We use a panel of household level data to estimate a structural model of demand for duration and number of calls of fixed telephony...

In this paper, we discuss the role of cable television networks and their ownership structure in promoting competition in the local access market. First, we show that the dual ownership of a local telephone network and a cable network, compared with separate ownership, may increase or decrease...

We analyze the impact of mandatory access on the infrastructure investments of two competing communications networks, and show that for low (high) access charges firms wait (preempt each other). Contrary to previous results, under preemption a higher access charge can delay first investment....

We analyze if two-part access tariffs solve the dynamic consistency problem of the regulation of Next Generation Networks. We model the industry as a duopoly, where a vertically integrated incumbent and a downstream entrant, that requires access to the incumbent's network, compete on Hotelling's...

We analyze the incentives of a telecommunications incumbent to invest and give access to a downstream entrant to a next generation network, NGN. We model the industry as a duopoly, where a vertically integrated incumbent and a downstream entrant, that requires access to the incumbent's network,...