Under the new Basle Capital Accords, regulation takes the form of a contingency rule prescribing a certain level of bank capital contingent on the bank's risk taking behaviour in choosing its asset portfolio. In a simple dynamic model of banking with binding regulation we show that such Basle II...

In a dynamic framework banks compete for customers by setting lending conditions for the loans they supply, taking into account the capital adequacy requirements posed by the regulator. By easing its lend- ing conditions a bank faces a tradeoff between attracting more demand for loans, thus...

Correlation between the risks of portfolios of different commercial banks leads to too much risk taking from a social planner's perspective. The presence of a regulator omproves this risk-benefit allocation of the financial system. In this paper I show that first-best regulation also leads to...

Correlation between the risks of portfolios of different commercial banks leads to too much risk taking from a social planner's perspective. The presence of a regulator improves this risk-benefit allocation of the financial system. In this paper I show that first-best regulation also leads to...

We provide a framework for analysing the choice between optimal and robust rules in the presence of paradigm uncertainty in monetary policy. We thus provide two issues: first, we discuss the conditions of uncertainty that render a robust rule a preferable substitute to optimal rules and second,...