The theoretical argument for central bank independence is based on the idea that even if the government represents people's preferences over inflation and output it has an incentive to renege from prearranged plans to gain a short run boost to output. This incentive leads to higher than desired...

This paper extends the Svensson inflation forecast targeting framework with a convex Phillips curve. An asymmetric target rule is derived, which implies a higher level of nominal interest rates than the Svensson forward-looking version of the reaction function popularised by Taylor. Extending...

There is a considerable academic literature on the relationship between Central Bank independence and inflation but the issue of Central Bank accountability and its effect of inflation performance has received very little attention. This paper looks at the issue of accountability in a simple...

The implications of uncertain policy preferences for the targeting and contracting approaches to monetary policy are investigated. It is shown that, in the presence of uncertain preferences, a linear incentive contract in the sense of Walsh performs better than an explicit inflation target as...

'In the aftermath of the crisis, redesigning the institutional framework governing money and finance to foster financial stability has become a priority. This volume brings together key contributions that help elucidate the economic and political complexity that must be addressed to improve the...

How to deliver adequate pension benefits at reasonable costs is a huge challenge confronting our ageing societies. This book delivers a comprehensive overview of the latest insights into pension finance, pension system design, pension governance and risk based supervision. It combines...