This paper explores a continuous-time agency model with double moral hazard. Using a venture capitalist—entrepreneur relationship where a manager provides unobservable effort while a venture capitalist (VC) both supplies unobservable effort and chooses the optimal timing of the initial public...

In this paper, we explore a dynamic theory of investment and costly managerial turnover given agency conflicts between the firm manager and investors. We incorporate the possibility of the successive replacement of managers until the firm is finally liquidated, and develop a continuous-time...

A game in which an incumbent and an entrant decide the timings of entries into a new market is investigated. The profit flows involve two uncertain factors: (1) the basic level of the demand of the market observed only by the incumbent and (2) the fluctuation of the profit flow described by a...

Apres une description rapide des caracteristiques respectives des echantillons de certificats de depot, cette note examine successivement les comportements selon les differents types d'emetteurs et de souscripteurs, et les consequences de ces distinctions sur les arbitrages operes sur le marche...

Si les stocks ou encours de credits detenus par les banques sont bien connus et permettent une mesure de differents risques bancaires, il n'existe en revanche aujourdh'hui en matiere de credit aucune information d'ensemble sur la production. En d'autres termes, peu de donnees sont disponibles au...

les conditions de financement des banques contribuent a expliquer leur comportement et en particulier les modifications de leur offre de pret a la suite de differents chocs. Dans cet article nous utilisons des donnees sur les emissions de certificats de depots francais pour etudier la...

Pour expliquer l'existence de regles de "stop-loss"dans les institutions financieres, nous developpons un modele principal-agent, ou une firme d'investissement (le principal) doit faire appel a l'expertise d'un operateur (l'agent) pour investir dans un actif risque et sophistique (par example un...

In the paper, we deal with the unexpected effects of new regulations and supervision and provide recommendations to ensure their effectiveness. New regulations essentially aim at strengthening the solvency and the liquidity of financial institutions. However, some technical aspects of these...

We measure the commonality in hedge fund returns, identify its main driving factor and analyze its implications for financial stability. We find that hedge funds’ commonality increased significantly from 2003 until 2006. We attribute this rise mainly to the increase in hedge funds’ exposure...

In this paper, I study how the CEO's election can be biased if some directors in the board belong to the same network. I use a static Bayesian game. Directors want to elect the best candidate but they also want to vote for the winner. In that context, results show that, when no candidate is part...