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Currency Union with and without Banking Union.
Bignon, V.; Breton, R.; Rojas Breu, M. - Banque de France - 2013
This paper analyzes a two-country model of currency, banks and endogenous default to study whether impediments to … impediments induce a higher cost for banks to manage cross-border credit compared to domestic credit, welfare may not be maximal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010816016
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Monetary Union with A Single Currency and Imperfect Credit Market Integration.
Bignon, V.; Breton, R.; Breu, M. Rojas - Banque de France - 2015
credit market integration are captured by variations in the cost for banks to grant credit for cross-border purchases. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011199814
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Bilateral Exposures and Systemic Solvency Risk.
Gourieroux, C.; Heam, J.C.; Monfort, A. - Banque de France - 2012
By introducing a structure of the balance sheets of the banks, which takes into account their bilateral exposures in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010815986
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L’identification des groupes bancaires et d’assurance d’importance systémique mondiale.
Feller J.-B.; Kersuzan M.-D. - Banque de France - 2014
Le 6 novembre 2014, le Conseil de stabilité financière (CSF/FSB) a publié simultanément une liste de trente groupes bancaires et une liste de neuf groupes d’assurance systémiques à l’échelle mondiale. Cette publication est l’aboutissement de travaux annuels du Comité de Bâle et de...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011201337
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Financing SMEs in Europe
Balling, Morten (ed.); Bernet, Beat (ed.); Gnan, Ernest (ed.) - Conference on "Financing SMEs in Europe" <2008, Paris>; … - 2009
Small and medium-sized enterprises are a centrepiece of Europe's economy. Due to their limited size and their generally lower creditworthiness, their access to financial market instruments is more limited than for large enterprises, which benefit from more elaborate Treasury operations,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011705468
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Do LTV and DSTI caps make banks more resilient?
Dietsch, M.; Welter-Nicol, C. - Banque de France - 2014
This study provides responses to the question of the effectiveness of Loan-To-Value (LTV) and Debt Service-To-Income (DSTI) caps to contribute to financial stability. Using a lender’s risk management perspective, the paper provides a new methodology extending the standard asymptotic single...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010929761
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Deposit Insurance Adoption and Bank Risk-Taking: the Role of Leverage
Lé, M. - Banque de France - 2013
of deposit insurance adoption on individual bank leverage. Using a panel of banks across 117 countries during the period … 1986-2011, I show that deposit insurance adoption pushes banks to increase significantly their leverage by reducing their … leveraged banks are unresponsive to deposit insurance adoption. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010929763
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Stress-testing banks’ corporate credit portfolio
Bandt, O. de; Dumontaux, N.; Martin, V.; Médée, D. - Banque de France - 2013
The paper describes the methods used by the French Banking Supervision Authority (ACP) to run stress tests for the corporate credit portfolio, through credit migration matrices (or transition matrices). This approach is currently used for “top-down” stress tests exercises. Developed for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010929765
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Stress-testing banks’ corporate credit portfolio
Bandt, O. de; Dumontaux, N.; Martin, V.; Médée, D. - Banque de France - 2013
The paper describes the methods used by the French Banking Supervision Authority (ACP) to run stress tests for the corporate credit portfolio, through credit migration matrices (or transition matrices). This approach is currently used for “top-down” stress tests exercises. Developed for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010929766
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A mathematical treatment of bank monitoring incentives
Pagès, H.; Possamai, D. - Banque de France - 2012
In this paper, we take up the analysis of a principal/agent model with moral hazard introduced in [15], with optimal contracting between a competitive investor and an impatient bank monitoring a pool of long-term loans subject to Markovian contagion. We provide here a comprehensive mathematical...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010544323