capital requirements. We use a unique database for the French banking sector between 2003 and 2011 combining confidential bank …-level Bank Lending Survey answers with the discretionary capital requirements set by the supervisory authority. We find that on …

The paper examines a continuous-time delegated monitoring problem between a competitive investor and an impatient bank … monitoring a pool of long-term loans subject to Markovian "contagion." Moral hazard induces a foreclosure bias unless the bank is … compensated with the right incentive-compatible contract. Fees are paid when the bank's performance is on target and liquidation …

crisis, which would otherwise blur the picture. I find that (i) public bank lending is significantly less cyclical than that … lending cyclicality. Then, the lower co-movement of public bank loans with macroeconomic fluctuations reveals both (a) a less … efficient public bank lending cyclicality, while evidences suggest it may reveal an inefficient credit allocation for less …

contracting between a competitive investor and an impatient bank monitoring a pool of long-term loans subject to Markovian … function and the optimal contract. Finally, we study the limit case where the bank is no longer impatient. …

of deposit insurance adoption on individual bank leverage. Using a panel of banks across 117 countries during the period … capital buffer. This increase in bank leverage then translates into higher probability of insolvency. Most importantly, I …

The paper examines a delegated monitoring problem between investors and a bank holding a portfolio of correlated loans … displaying “contagion.” Moral hazard prevents the bank from monitoring continuously unless it is compensated with the right … incentive-compatible contract. The asset pool is liquidated when losses exceed a state-contingent cut-off rule. The bank bears a …