Explicit deposit insurance is a crucial ingredient of modern financial safety nets. This paper investigates the effect of deposit insurance adoption on individual bank leverage. Using a panel of banks across 117 countries during the period 1986-2011, I show that deposit insurance adoption pushes...

The paper describes the methods used by the French Banking Supervision Authority (ACP) to run stress tests for the corporate credit portfolio, through credit migration matrices (or transition matrices). This approach is currently used for “top-down” stress tests exercises. Developed for...

The paper describes the methods used by the French Banking Supervision Authority (ACP) to run stress tests for the corporate credit portfolio, through credit migration matrices (or transition matrices). This approach is currently used for “top-down” stress tests exercises. Developed for...

In this paper, we take up the analysis of a principal/agent model with moral hazard introduced in [15], with optimal contracting between a competitive investor and an impatient bank monitoring a pool of long-term loans subject to Markovian contagion. We provide here a comprehensive mathematical...

This paper examines the sensitivity of non-financial corporate lending to banks' capital ratio and their supervisory capital requirements. We use a unique database for the French banking sector between 2003 and 2011 combining confidential bank-level Bank Lending Survey answers with the...

The paper examines a continuous-time delegated monitoring problem between a competitive investor and an impatient bank monitoring a pool of long-term loans subject to Markovian "contagion." Moral hazard induces a foreclosure bias unless the bank is compensated with the right incentive-compatible...

This paper examines empirically to which extent public banks feature a different pattern in their lending behaviour over macroeconomic fluctuations. Based on a unique dataset from 1990 to 2010, including at most 459 public banks in 93 countries, I can handle ownership change by including records...

The paper examines a delegated monitoring problem between investors and a bank holding a portfolio of correlated loans displaying “contagion.” Moral hazard prevents the bank from monitoring continuously unless it is compensated with the right incentive-compatible contract. The asset pool is...

We propose a rigorous and flexible methodological framework to select and calibrate initial shocks to be used in bank stress test scenarios based on statistical techniques for detecting outliers in time series of risk factors. Our approach allows us to characterize not only the magnitude, but...