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Efficient and Stable Collective Choices under Crowding Preferences
Massó, Jordi; Nicolò, Antonio - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2004
We consider a set of agents who have to choose one alternative among a finite set of social alternatives. A final allocation is a pair given by the selected alternative and the group of its users. Agents have crowding preferences over allocations: between any pair of allocations with the same...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547378
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Voting by Committees under Constraints
Barberà, Salvador; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2001
characterize the families of strategy-proof voting procedures when not all possible subsets of objects are feasible, and voters …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010773124
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The Social Contract with Endogenous Sentiments
Cervellati, Matteo; Esteban, Joan; Kranich, Laurence - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2007
and the social contract in a model of rational voting over redistribution where individual self-esteem and relative es …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547222
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Redistributive Taxation with Endogenous Sentiments
Cervellati, Matteo; Esteban, Joan Mª; Kranich, Laurence - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2005
a model of rational voting over redistribution where individual attitudes toward others are endogenously determined …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547329
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Work Values, Endogenous Sentiments and Redistribution
Cervellati, Matteo; Esteban, Joan; Kranich, Laurence - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2010
voting over redistribution. Agents have moral work values. Individuals self-esteem and social consideration of others are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547511