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Public Goods and Voting on Formal Sanction Schemes: An Experiment
Putterman, Louis; Tyran, Jean-Robert; Kamei, Kenju - Økonomisk Institut, Københavns Universitet - 2010
interest in those parameters, voting patterns suggest significant influence of cooperative orientation, political attitudes …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008546994
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State or Nature? Formal vs. Informal Sanctioning in the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods
Kamei, Kenju; Putterman, Louis; Tyran, Jean-Robert - Økonomisk Institut, Københavns Universitet - 2011
chosen by voting. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008836655
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Efficient and Stable Collective Choices under Crowding Preferences
Massó, Jordi; Nicolò, Antonio - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2004
We consider a set of agents who have to choose one alternative among a finite set of social alternatives. A final allocation is a pair given by the selected alternative and the group of its users. Agents have crowding preferences over allocations: between any pair of allocations with the same...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547378
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Voting by Committees under Constraints
Barberà, Salvador; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2001
characterize the families of strategy-proof voting procedures when not all possible subsets of objects are feasible, and voters …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010773124