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We consider a set of agents who have to choose one alternative among a finite set of social alternatives. A final allocation is a pair given by the selected alternative and the group of its users. Agents have crowding preferences over allocations: between any pair of allocations with the same...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547378
. Shareholders determine production plans by voting — one share, one vote — and at ?-majority stable stock market equilibria …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005749639
characterize the families of strategy-proof voting procedures when not all possible subsets of objects are feasible, and voters …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010773124
In the present paper we study voting-based corporate control in a general equilibrium model with incomplete financial … markets. Since voting takes place in a multi-dimensional setting, super-majority rules are needed to ensure existence of … equilibrium. In a linear-quadratic setup we show that the endogenization of voting weights (given by portfolio holdings) can give …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005225438
A commodity is shared between some individuals: There is an initial allocation; some selection procedures are used to choose an alternative allocation and; individuals decide between keeping the initial allocation or shifting to the alternative allocation. The selection procedures are supposed to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005232991