Showing 1 - 10 of 15
We extend Aumann's theorem [Aumann 1987], deriving correlated equilibria as a consequence of common priors and common knowledge of rationality, by explicitly allowing for non-rational behavior. We replace the assumption of common knowledge of rationality with a substantially weaker one, joint...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851330
By identifying types whose low-order beliefs up to level ℓ<sub>i</sub> about the state of nature coincide, we obtain quotient type spaces that are typically smaller than the original ones, preserve basic topological properties, and allow standard equilibrium analysis even under bounded reasoning. Our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011019697
We study a market in which both buyers and sellers can decide to preempt and set theirquantities before market clearing. Will this lead to preemption on both sides of the market,only one side of the market, or to no preemption at all? We …nd that preemption tends to beasymmetric in the sense...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866824
Conventions can be narrowly interpreted as coordinated ways of equilibriumplay, i.e., a specific convention tells all players in a game withmultiple strict equilibria which equilibrium to play. In our view, coordinationoften takes place before learning about the games. Thus, one hasto coordinate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866835
In one-shot investment game experiments where each player's payo is a convexcombination of own and other's prot, trust remains unaected by the extent of interdependencewhereas trustworthiness reacts positively to it.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866849
To explain why pre-play communication increases cooperation in games,one refers to a) strategic causes such as efficient communication or reputationeffects, and b) changes in the utilities due to social processes. Hithertoexperimental support for both explanations is mixed and confounded....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866851
We study the effects of leadership on the private provision of a public good when group members are heterogeneously endowed. Leadership is implemented as a sequential public goods game where one group member contributes first and all the others follow. Our results show that the presence of a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866855
We study sequential parimutuel betting markets with asymmetrically informed bettors, usingan experimental approach. In one treatment, groups of eight participants play twenty repetitionsof a sequential betting game. The second treatment is identical, except that bettors are observedby other...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866873
A profit-maximizing auctioneer can provide a public good to at most one of a number of groups of agents. The groups may have non-empty intersections. Each group member has a private value for the good being provided to the group. We investigate an auction mechanism where the auctioneer provides...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005043652
We explore the consequences of the assumptions used in modern cryptographywhen applied to repeated games with public communication. Technically speaking, we model agents by polynomial Turing machinesand assume the existence of a trapdoor function. Under these conditions, we prove a Folk Theorem...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005043731