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This paper surveys the literature on strategy-proofness from a historical perspective. While I discuss the connections with other works on incentives in mechanism design, the main emphasis is on social choice models. This article has been prepared for the Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010773120
Through an experiment, we investigate how the level of rationality relates to concerns for equality and efficiency. Subjects perform dictator games and a guessing game. More rational subjects are not more frequently of the self-regarding type. When performing a comparison within the same degree...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547342
Adopting a simplistic view of Coase (1960), most economic analyses of property rights disregard both the key advantage that legal property rights (that is, in rem rights) provide to rightholders in terms of enhanced enforcement, and the difficulties they pose to acquirers in terms of information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547227
characterize the families of strategy-proof voting procedures when not all possible subsets of objects are feasible, and voters …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010773124
proposers screen the proposed candidates by voting for v of them and then choose those k with the highest support. We then speak …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851425
When the members of a voting body exhibit single peaked preferences, majority winners exist. Moreover, the median(s) of … condition, and there are many examples in the literature of environments where voting equilibria exist even if single peakedness …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010773129
sequential voting procedures, the amendment and the successive procedure. Tournaments and super-majority voting with arbitrary … quota q are special cases of the general sequential voting games we consider. We show that when using the same quota, both …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010961555