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Efficient and Stable Collective Choices under Crowding Preferences
Massó, Jordi; Nicolò, Antonio - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2004
We consider a set of agents who have to choose one alternative among a finite set of social alternatives. A final allocation is a pair given by the selected alternative and the group of its users. Agents have crowding preferences over allocations: between any pair of allocations with the same...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547378
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On Exiting after Voting
Berga, Dolors; Bergantiños, Gustavo; Massó, Jordi; … - Departament d'Economia, Facultat de Ciències … - 2003
analyze the voting behavior of members who take into account the effect of their votes not only on the chosen alternative, but …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005051022
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Voting by Committees under Constraints
Barberà, Salvador; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2001
characterize the families of strategy-proof voting procedures when not all possible subsets of objects are feasible, and voters …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010773124