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Voting over piece-wise linear tax methods

Moreno-Ternero, Juan D. - Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica, Facultad … - 2010

We analyze the problem of choosing the most appropriate method for apportioning taxes in a democracy. We consider a simple model of taxation and restrict our attention to piece- wise linear tax methods, which are almost ubiquitous in advanced democracies worldwide. In spite of facing an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008487466

An Experimental Analysis of Informational Feedback and Commitment

Fatas, Enrique; Godoy, Sara; Salaz, Héctor - Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica, Facultad … - 2011

In this paper we experimentally manipulate the informational feedback and the technology used in two team production games. Production functions are aggregative (a standard linear VCM) or weak link (the minimum or weakest link game, WLM). We analyze two informational conditions, relative to a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010903239

“Show the right thing to do”. The effect of exemplary behavior in public good games

Godoy, Sara - Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica, Facultad … - 2011

Using a linear public good game we investigate the role of exemplary behavior on cooperation in public goods games. Subjects face the chance of show a good (like the employee of the month) or a bad example (evading taxes) to the rest of their group, knowing in advance that the unique feedback...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010903240

Voting by conforminy

Moreno, Bernardo; Ramos-Sosa, María del Pino - Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica, Facultad … - 2015

A group of agents has to decide whether to accept or reject a proposal. Agents vote in favor or against the proposal and, if the number of agents in favor is greater to certain quota, the proposal is accepted. The \textit{socially optimal decision} is the one adopted when all agents vote...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011204533

Threats and demonstrations of power: experimental results on bilateral bargaining

Navarro, Noemí; Veszteg, Róbert Ferenc - Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica, Facultad … - 2008

We test the empirical effectiveness of threats in equilibrating bargaining power in simple bilateral bargaining games. Our experimental design is based on the two-player versions of the multibidding game (Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein, 2001) and the bid-and-propose game (Navarro and Perea,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005081426

Top Monotonicity: A Common Root for Single Peakedness, Single Crossing and the Median Voter Result

Barberà, Salvador; Moreno, Bernardo - Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica, Facultad … - 2008

When the members of a voting body exhibit single peaked preferences, majority winners exist. Moreover, the median(s) of … sufficient condition. Yet, there are many examples in the literature of environments where voting equilibria exist and …), intermediateness (Grandmont, 1978) or order restriction (Rothstein, 1990). Still other interesting cases of existence of voting …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005081427

Off-the-peak preferences over government size

Martínez-Mora, Francisco; Puy, M. Socorro - Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica, Facultad … - 2009

In this paper, we analyze the political consequences derived from policy preferences which are non-symmetric around the peak. While the assumption of symmetric preferences is innocuous in political equi- libria with platforms convergence, it is not neutral when candidates are differentiated....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008513038

Stable Coalition-Governments: The Case of Three Political Parties

Puy, M. Socorro - Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica, Facultad … - 2009

We explore to what extent we can propose fixed negotiation rules as well as simple mechanisms (or protocols) that guarantee that political parties can form stable coalition-governments. We analyze the case where three parties can hold office in the form of two-party coalitions. We define the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004997393

Strategic communication: screening and signaling in a freelance journalist - editor game

Andina-Díaz, Ascensión - Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica, Facultad … - 2008

We model strategic communication as a two-period game between an advisor and a decision maker, in which the advisor has private information on a policy-relevant state of the world but does not know the motives of the decision maker. If the advisor has the desire to please the decision maker and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005031973

Indicators of Electoral Victory

Amoros, Pablo; Puy, M. Socorro - Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica, Facultad … - 2008

We study a two-party contest where candidates strategically allocate their campaign resources between two salient issues. We analyze to what extent the following indicators of a party's success predict the electoral victory: (1) the pre-campaign advantage, (2) the advantage on every salient...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005031974