characterize the families of strategy-proof voting procedures when not all possible subsets of objects are feasible, and voters …

proposers screen the proposed candidates by voting for v of them and then choose those k with the highest support. We then speak …

When the members of a voting body exhibit single peaked preferences, majority winners exist. Moreover, the median(s) of … sufficient condition. Yet, there are many examples in the literature of environments where voting equilibria exist and …), intermediateness (Grandmont, 1978) or order restriction (Rothstein, 1990). Still other interesting cases of existence of voting …

When the members of a voting body exhibit single peaked preferences, majority winners exist. Moreover, the median(s) of … condition, and there are many examples in the literature of environments where voting equilibria exist even if single peakedness …

sequential voting procedures, the amendment and the successive procedure. Tournaments and super-majority voting with arbitrary … quota q are special cases of the general sequential voting games we consider. We show that when using the same quota, both …