Showing 1 - 10 of 18
Introducing a threshold in the sense of a minimal project size transforms a public goods game with an inefficient … thresholds are ineffective at best and often counter-productive. This holds under a range of threshold levels and refund rates …. We test if thresholds perform better if they are endogenously chosen, i.e. if a threshold is approved in a referendum …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008497581
interest in those parameters, voting patterns suggest significant influence of cooperative orientation, political attitudes …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008546994
). Being adopted by voting appears to enhance the efficiency of both informal sanctions and non-deterrent formal sanctions. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008836656
expert decide” in committee voting is influenced by the probability of corrupt experts, and that influence can have, to a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010929078
treatment) is a salient fairness principle in taxation that shapes voting on commodity taxes above and beyond concerns for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010722847
of tax shifting in the market. We show that tax salience biases consumers’ voting on tax regimes, and that experience is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005749719
economics. This paper explores voting on a scheme of intergroup competition which facilitates cooperation in a social dilemma … outcome depends strongly on specific voting rules of institutional choice. If the majority decides, competition is almost …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011277839
In this paper, we study the effectiveness of intergroup competition in promoting cooperative behavior. We focus on intergroup competition that is non-rival in the sense that everyone can be a winner. This type of competition does not give groups an incentive to outcompete others. However, in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005749767
chosen by voting. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008836655
Cooperation can be induced by an authority with the power to mete out sanctions for free riders, but law enforcement is prone to error. This paper experimentally analyzes preferences for and consequences of errors in formal sanctions against free riders in a public goods game. With type I...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011085473