Similar Search Results

Voting on Thresholds for Public Goods: Experimental Evidence

Rauchdobler, Julian; Sausgruber, Rupert; Tyran, Jean-Robert - Økonomisk Institut, Københavns Universitet - 2009

Introducing a threshold in the sense of a minimal project size transforms a public goods game with an inefficient … thresholds are ineffective at best and often counter-productive. This holds under a range of threshold levels and refund rates …. We test if thresholds perform better if they are endogenously chosen, i.e. if a threshold is approved in a referendum …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008497581

Legitimacy, Communication and Leadership in the Turnaround Game

Brandts, Jordi; Cooper, David J.; Weber, Roberto A. - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2014

We study the effectiveness of leaders for inducing coordinated organizational change to a more efficient equilibrium, i.e., a turnaround. We compare communication from leaders to incentive increases and also compare the effectiveness of randomly selected and elected leaders. While all...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851357

Recreating the South Sea Bubble: Lessons from an Experiment in Financial History

Giusti, Giovanni; Noussair, Charles; Voth, Hans-Joachim - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2013

Major bubble episodes are rare events. In this paper, we examine what factors might cause some asset price bubbles to become very large. We recreate, in a laboratory setting, some of the specific institutional features investors in the South Sea Company faced in 1720. Several factors have been...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851451

Not Just Like Starting Over: Leadership and Revivification of Cooperation in Groups

Brandts, Jordi; Rott, Christina; Solà, Carles - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2015

We conduct a laboratory experiment to study how, after a history of decay, cooperation in a repeated voluntary contribution game can be revived in an enduring way. Simply starting the repeated game over - a simple fresh start - leads to an initial increase of cooperation, but to a subsequent new...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011261233

Competitions with Forward Contracts: A Laboratory Analysis Motivated by Electricity Market Design

Brandts, Jordi; Pezanis-Christou, Paul; Schram, Arthur - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2003

We use experiments to study the efficiency effects for a market as a whole of adding the possibility of forward …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547195

Personal Relations and their Effect on Behavior in an Organizational Setting: An Experimental Study

Brandts, Jordi; Solà, Carles - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2006

We study how personal relations affect performance in organizations. In the experimental game we use a manager has to assign different degrees of decision power to two employees. These two employees then have to make distributive decisions which affect themselves and the manager. Our focus is on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547529

The dark side of friendship: envy

Cobo-Reyes, Ramón; Jiménez, Natalia - Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica, Facultad … - 2007

This paper studies the e¤ect of social relations on the convergence to the e¢ cient equilibrium in a 2x2 coordination game. We employ a 2x2 factorial design in which we explore two di¤erent games with asymmetric payo¤s and two matching protocols: .friends.versus .strangers.. In the .rst game...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005449609

The Role of Role Uncertainty in Modified Dictator Games

Iriberri, Nagore; Rey-Biel, Pedro - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2009

experiments that aim to measure the prevalence of interdependent preferences. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851352

Measuring Risk Aversion with Lists: A New Bias

Bosch-Domènech, Antoni; Silvestre, Joaquim - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2012

Various experimental procedures aimed at measuring individual risk aversion involve a list of pairs of alternative prospects. We first study the widely used method by Holt and Laury (2002), for which we find that the removal of some items from the lists yields a systematic decrease in risk...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011019689

Threats and demonstrations of power: experimental results on bilateral bargaining

Navarro, Noemí; Veszteg, Róbert Ferenc - Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica, Facultad … - 2008

We test the empirical effectiveness of threats in equilibrating bargaining power in simple bilateral bargaining games. Our experimental design is based on the two-player versions of the multibidding game (Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein, 2001) and the bid-and-propose game (Navarro and Perea,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005081426