We study the effects of reputation and competition in a stylized market for experience goods. If interaction is anonymous, such markets perform poorly: sellers are not trustworthy, and buyers do not trust sellers. If sellers are identifiable and can, hence, build a reputation, efficiency...

Arguing that consumers are the carriers of firms’ reputations, we examine the role of consumer networks for trust in markets that suffer from moral hazard. When consumers are embedded in a network, they can exchange information with their neighbours about their private experiences with...

I analyze the post-electoral coalition formation process in a two dimensional political environment. The two dimensions are the degree of a proportional tax rate and the degree of a group-speci?c public good. Parties are o¢ ce-motivated and care instrumentally about policy. I analyze when...

Professional experts offer advice with the objective of appearing well informed. Their ability is evaluated on the basis of the advice given and of the realized state of the world. This situation is modeled as a reputational cheap-talk game in which the expert receives a signal of continuously...

This paper analyzes the political economy of income redistribution when voters are concerned about tax compliance. We consider a two stagemodel where there is a two party competition over the tax rate in the first stage and voters decide about their level of tax compliance in the second stage....

This paper analyzes the political economy of income redistribution when voters are concerned about fairness in tax compliance. We consider a two stage-model where there is a two-party competition over the tax rate and over the intensity of the tax enforcement policy in the first stage, and...