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Introducing a threshold in the sense of a minimal project size transforms a public goods game with an inefficient … thresholds are ineffective at best and often counter-productive. This holds under a range of threshold levels and refund rates …. We test if thresholds perform better if they are endogenously chosen, i.e. if a threshold is approved in a referendum …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008497581
interest in those parameters, voting patterns suggest significant influence of cooperative orientation, political attitudes …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008546994
). Being adopted by voting appears to enhance the efficiency of both informal sanctions and non-deterrent formal sanctions. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008836656
present the results of two separate experiments. The first experiment serves to provide necessary methodological prerequisites …) captures the stylized facts of both experiments. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005247885
difficult to study human behavior in a synthetic or theoretic manner. We present results from experiments with dilemma games …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547112
expert decide” in committee voting is influenced by the probability of corrupt experts, and that influence can have, to a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010929078
treatment) is a salient fairness principle in taxation that shapes voting on commodity taxes above and beyond concerns for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010722847
of tax shifting in the market. We show that tax salience biases consumers’ voting on tax regimes, and that experience is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005749719
economics. This paper explores voting on a scheme of intergroup competition which facilitates cooperation in a social dilemma … outcome depends strongly on specific voting rules of institutional choice. If the majority decides, competition is almost …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011277839
Similar to Levati and Neugebauer (2001), a clock is used by which participants can vary their individual contributions for voluntarily providing a public good. As time goes by, participants either in(de)crease their contribution gradually or keep it constant. Groups of two poorly and two richly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005252197