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Breaking the Symmetry: Optimal Conventions in Repeated Symmetric Games

Bhaskar, V. - EconWPA - 1997

We analyze the problem of coordinating upon asymmetric equilibria in a symmetric game, such as the battle-of-the-sexes. In repeated interaction, asymmetric coordination is possible possible via symmetric repeated game strategies. This requires that players randomize initially and adopt a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407601

Sustaining Cooperation in trust Games

McCabe, Kevin; Rigdon, Mary; Smith, Vernon - EconWPA - 2004

It is well-known in evolutionary game theory that population clustering in Prisoner Dilemma games allows some cooperative strategies to invade populations of stable defecting strategies. We adapt this idea of population clustering to a two-person trust game. Players are typed based on their...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005125594

What Price Fairness? A Bargaining Study

Zwick, Rami; Chen, Xiao-Ping - EconWPA - 1999

Our study concerns bargaining behavior in situations where one party is in a stronger position than the other. We investigate both the tradeoff the favored party makes between pursuing his strategic advantage and giving weight to other players' concern for fairness, and the tradeoff the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005556668

Low Information Games - Experimental Evidence on Learning in Ultimatum Bargaining

Slembeck, Tilman - EconWPA - 1999

view that certain learning conditions are less favourable in terms of individual outcomes than others as suggested by the … contingent learning approach (Slembeck, 1998). Furthermore, there is evidence that proposers behave "less fair" when responders …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005125583

Social norms and human cooperation

Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs - EconWPA - 2004

The existence of social norms is one of the big unsolved problems in social cognitive science. Although no other concept is invoked more frequently in the social sciences, we still know little about how social norms are formed, the forces determining their content, and the cognitive and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005076756

Third-party punishment and social norms

Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs - EconWPA - 2004

We examine the characteristics and relative strength of third-party sanctions in a series of experiments. We … hypothesize that egalitarian distribution norms and cooperation norms apply in our experiments, and that third parties, whose …’’ third parties. In addition, these experiments suggest that thirdparty punishment games are powerful tools for studying the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005125599

Trust and Reciprocity in Incentive Contracting

Rigdon, Mary - EconWPA - 2005

(paradoxically) crowds out efficient solutions to the agency problem. This paper explores, via a novel set of laboratory experiments …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005556679

Altruism, Spite and Competition in Bargaining Games

Montero, Maria - EconWPA - 2005

This paper shows that altruism may be beneficial in bargaining when there is competition for bargaining partners. In a game with random proposers, the most altruistic player has the highest material payoff if players are sufficiently patient. However, this advantage is eroded as the discount...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124853

Invariance failure under subgame perfectness in sequential bargaining

Zwick, Rami; Weg, Eythan; Rapoport, Amnon - EconWPA - 1999

A basic property of any normative theory of decision making --- individual or group --- is its invariance under the theory's own equivalence specification. Growing evidence from experimental studies in several areas of game playing indicates that the game-theoretic notion of strategic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005125604

Efficiency and Voluntary Implementation in Markets with Repeated Pairwise Bargaining

Jackson, Matthew O.; Palfrey, Thomas R. - EconWPA - 1997

We examine a simple bargaining setting, where heterogeneous buyers and sellers are repeatedly matched with each other. We begin by characterizing efficiency in such a dynamic setting, and discuss how it differs from efficiency in a centralized static setting. We then study the allocations which...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062338