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Breaking the Symmetry: Optimal Conventions in Repeated Symmetric Games

Bhaskar, V. - EconWPA - 1997

We analyze the problem of coordinating upon asymmetric equilibria in a symmetric game, such as the battle-of-the-sexes. In repeated interaction, asymmetric coordination is possible possible via symmetric repeated game strategies. This requires that players randomize initially and adopt a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407601

Social norms and human cooperation

Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs - EconWPA - 2004

The existence of social norms is one of the big unsolved problems in social cognitive science. Although no other concept is invoked more frequently in the social sciences, we still know little about how social norms are formed, the forces determining their content, and the cognitive and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005076756

Third-party punishment and social norms

Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs - EconWPA - 2004

We examine the characteristics and relative strength of third-party sanctions in a series of experiments. We … hypothesize that egalitarian distribution norms and cooperation norms apply in our experiments, and that third parties, whose …’’ third parties. In addition, these experiments suggest that thirdparty punishment games are powerful tools for studying the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005125599

Behavioral Strategies in Repeated Pure Coordination Games

Zwick, Rami; Rapoport, Amnon; Lo, Alison King Chung - EconWPA - 2001

We study experimentally a class of pure coordination games as a special case of the Consumer Choice of Prizes game developed by Rapoport et al. (2000). We find a high level of group coordination coupled with considerable switching in the choice of locations. Two models are proposed and tested to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005408213

Choice of Prizes Allocated by Multiple Lotteries with Endogenously Determined Probabilities

Rapoport, Amnon; Lo, Alison King Chung; Zwick, Rami - EconWPA - 2001

iteration of the same game along the lines suggested by anticipatory learning models. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005556674

Strengths of the Weakest-Link

Février, Philippe; ) Laurent Linnemer - EconWPA - 2002

The "Weakest Link" is a game show full of paradox. To increase the probability of winning, contestants should eliminate the strongest players. Yet, if it is anticipated that the best player is to be eliminated, participants do not answer questions correctly and nothing is gained. We solve a game...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005556682

The Donor Problem

Abbink, Klaus; Ellman, Matthew - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2005

Donors often rely on local intermediaries to deliver benefits to target beneficiaries. Each selected recipient observes if the intermediary under-delivers to them, so they serve as natural monitors. However, they may withhold complaints when feeling unentitled or grateful to the intermediary for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851320

On Punishment and Well-being

Brandts, Jordi; Rivas, María Fernanda - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2007

The existence of punishment opportunities has been shown to cause efficiency in public goods experiments to increase …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851350

Observability and Overcoming Coordination Failure in Organizations. An Experimental Study

Brandts, Jordi; Cooper, David J. - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2004

examine the sensitivity of this result to the ability of people to observe others' choices. Our experiments are set in a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547425

Leadership and Overcoming Coordination Failure with Asymmetric Costs

Brandts, Jordi; Cooper, David J.; Fatas, Enrique - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2006

We study how the heterogeneity of agents affects the extent to which changes in financial incentives can pull a group out of a situation of coordination failure. We focus on the connections between cost asymmetries and leadership. Experimental subjects interact in groups of four in a series of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547446