Showing 1 - 10 of 16
We analyze the problem of coordinating upon asymmetric equilibria in a symmetric game, such as the battle-of-the-sexes. In repeated interaction, asymmetric coordination is possible possible via symmetric repeated game strategies. This requires that players randomize initially and adopt a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407601
In a repeated game with private information, a perfect public equilibrium (PPE) can break down if communication is not necessarily simultaneous or if players can “spy” on each others’ information. An ex post perfect public equilibrium (EPPPE) is a PPE that is ex post incentive compatible...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407608
Folk Theorems in repeated games hold fixed the game payoffs, while the discount factor is varied freely. We show that these results may be sensitive to the order of limits in situations where players move asynchronously. Specifically, we show that when moves are asynchronous, then for a fixed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550877
This paper examines the issue of multiplicity of equilibria in alternating move repeated games with two players. Such games are canonical models of environments with repeated, asynchronous choices due to inertia or replacement. We focus our attention on Markov Perfect equilibria (MPE). These are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550884
adaptive learning rules do not take such information into account and optimal adaptive rules do not differ much between the two …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550889
We show that, in repeated common interest games without discounting, strong `perturbation implies efficiency' results require that the perturbations must include strategies which are `draconian' in the sense that they are prepared to punish to the maximum extent possible. Moreover, there is a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407513
The paper analyzes the Nash equilibria of two-person discounted repeated games with one-sided incomplete information and known own payoffs. If the informed player is arbitrarily patient relative to the uninformed player, then the characterization for the informed player's payoffs is essentially...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005550893
inexperienced central bankers. In our experiments, subjects repeatedly set the short-term interest rate for a computer economy with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005126190
We study experimentally a class of pure coordination games as a special case of the Consumer Choice of Prizes game developed by Rapoport et al. (2000). We find a high level of group coordination coupled with considerable switching in the choice of locations. Two models are proposed and tested to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005408213
iteration of the same game along the lines suggested by anticipatory learning models. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005556674