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Not Just Like Starting Over: Leadership and Revivification of Cooperation in Groups

Brandts, Jordi; Rott, Christina; Solà, Carles - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2015

We conduct a laboratory experiment to study how, after a history of decay, cooperation in a repeated voluntary contribution game can be revived in an enduring way. Simply starting the repeated game over - a simple fresh start - leads to an initial increase of cooperation, but to a subsequent new...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011261233

Personal Relations and their Effect on Behavior in an Organizational Setting: An Experimental Study

Brandts, Jordi; Solà, Carles - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2006

We study how personal relations affect performance in organizations. In the experimental game we use a manager has to assign different degrees of decision power to two employees. These two employees then have to make distributive decisions which affect themselves and the manager. Our focus is on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547529

Are Self-regarding Subjects More Rational?

Arruñada, Benito; Casari, Marco; Pancotto, Francesca - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2012

Through an experiment, we investigate how the level of rationality relates to concerns for equality and efficiency. Subjects perform dictator games and a guessing game. More rational subjects are not more frequently of the self-regarding type. When performing a comparison within the same degree...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547342

Property as an Economic Concept: Reconciling Legal and Economic Conceptions of Property Rights in a Coasean Framework

Arruñada, Benito - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2012

Adopting a simplistic view of Coase (1960), most economic analyses of property rights disregard both the key advantage that legal property rights (that is, in rem rights) provide to rightholders in terms of enhanced enforcement, and the difficulties they pose to acquirers in terms of information...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547227

A Characterization of Sequential Rationalizability

Apesteguia, Jose; Ballester, Miguel Angel - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2008

sequentially rationalizable. Finally, we show that some prominent voting mechanisms are also sequentially rationalizable. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011253113

A Foundation for Strategic Agenda Voting

Apesteguia, Jose; Ballester, Miguel Angel; Masatlioglu, … - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2012

We offer complete characterizations of the equilibrium outcomes of two prominent agenda voting institutions that are … equivalently the Euro-Latin procedure. Our axiomatic approach provides a proper understanding of these voting institutions, and … allows comparisons between them, and with other voting procedures. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011253112