I provide a justification of intellectual property rights as a source of static efficiency gains in manufacturing, rather than dynamic benefits from greater innovation. I develop a property-rights model of a supply relationship with two dimensions of non-contractible investment. In equilibrium,...

I analyze the basis of the market economy in classical Rome, from the perspective of personal-versus-impersonal exchange and focusing on the role of the state in providing market-enabling institutions. I start by reviewing the central conflict in all exchanges between those holding and those...

The choice network revenue management model incorporates customer purchase behavior as a function of the offered products, and is the appropriate model for airline and hotel network revenue management, dynamic sales of bundles, and dynamic assortment optimization. The optimization problem is a...

The network choice revenue management problem models customers as choosing from an offer-set, and the firm decides the best subset to offer at any given moment to maximize expected revenue. The resulting dynamic program for the firm is intractable and approximated by a deterministic linear...

The choice network revenue management (RM) model incorporates customer purchase behavior as customers purchasing products with certain probabilities that are a function of the offered assortment of products, and is the appropriate model for airline and hotel network revenue management, dynamic...

The dynamic program for choice network RM is intractable and approximated by a deterministic linear program called the CDLP. When the segment consideration sets overlap, the CDLP is difficult to solve. A weaker formulation (SDCP+) is tractable and approximates the CDLP value very closely. We...

The network revenue management (RM) problem arises in airline, hotel, media, and other industries where the sale products use multiple resources. It can be formulated as a stochastic dynamic program but the dynamic program is computationally intractable because of an exponentially large state...

In this paper, we study mechanism design under collusion and uniform transfers focusing on the transaction costs in coalition formation created by asymmetric information among agents. We are particularly interested in the interaction between incompleteness of contracts and collusion: in our...

We consider a model of preference in an asymmetric procurement auction with two suppliers. The buyer can award the contract to a preferred supplier at the bid of a competing supplier. As such, the preferred supplier has a right-of-first-refusal. The preferred supplier may be an independent firm...

We analyse the effects of investment decisions and firms' internal organisation on the efficiency and stability of horizontal mergers. In our framework economies of scale are endogenous and there might be internal conflict within merged firms. We show that often stable mergers do not lead to...