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Growth and Violence: Argument for a Per Capita Measure of Civil War

Mueller, Hannes - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2014

a debate on the right model can help distinguish between competing theories in the conflict literature. This is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851411

Inter-Group Conflict and Intra-Group Punishment in an Experimental Contest Game

Abbink, Klaus; Brandts, Jordi; Herrmann, Benedikt; … - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2007

We study how conflict in a contest game is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to … punish each other. Our main motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The relevant theoretical … prediction in our setting is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and independent of whether punishment is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851463

Polarization: Concepts, Measurement, Estimation

Duclos, Jean-Yves; Esteban, Joan; Ray, Debraj - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2003

The purpose of this paper is two-fold. First, we develop the measurement theory of polarization for the case in which income distributions can be described using density functions. Second, we provide sample estimators of population polarization indices that can be used to compare polarization...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547136

Endogenous bargaining power

Esteban, Joan; Sákovics, József - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2003

determined by how the direct conflict resulting from disagreement would be resolved. Our basic building block is the disagreement … individual rationality we reach a unique solution: the agreement in the shadow of conflict, ASC. This agreement may be construed …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547148

A Theory of Agreements in the Shadow of Conflict

Esteban, Joan Mª; Sákovics, József - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2005

determined by how the direct conflict resulting from disagreement would be resolved. Our basic building block is the disagreement … conflict, ASC. This agreement may be construed as the limit of a sequence of partial agreements, each of which is reached as a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547215

Linking Conflict to Inequality and Polarization

Esteban, Joan; Ray, Debraj - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2009

In this paper we study a behavioral model of conflict that provides a basis for choosing certain indices of dispersion … as indicators for conflict. We show that the (equilibrium) level of conflict can be expressed as an (approximate) linear …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547270

Olson vs. Coase: Coalitional Worth in Conflict

Esteban, Joan Mª; Sákovics, József - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2003

We analyze a model of conflict with endogenous choice of effort, where subsets of the contenders may force the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547421

Endogenous Depth of Reasoning

Alaoui, Larbi; Penta, Antonio - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2014

We introduce a model of strategic thinking in games of initial response. Unlike standard level-k models, in this framework the player's `depth of reasoning' is endogenously determined, and it can be disentangled from his beliefs over his opponent's cognitive bound. In our approach, individuals...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851323

The value of useless information

Alaoui, Larbi - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2012

There are many situations in which individuals have a choice of whether or not to observe eventual outcomes. In these instances, individuals often prefer to remain ignorant. These contexts are outside the scope of analysis of the standard von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) expected utility model,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547096

Aversion to Inequality and Segregating Equilibria

Cabrales, Antonio; Calvó-Armengol, Antoni - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2005

This paper shows that models where preferences of individuals depend not only on their allocations, but also on the well-being of other persons, can produce both large and testable effects. We study the allocation of workers with heterogeneous productivities to firms. We show that even small...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547201