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Entry and Market Selection of Firms: A Laboratory Study

Brandts, Jordi; Giritligil, Ayça Ebru - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2006

We study competition in experimental markets in which two incumbents face entry by three other firms. Our treatments … vary with respect to three factors: sequential vs. block or simultaneous entry, the cost functions of entrants and the … amount of time during which incumbents are protected from entry. Before entry incumbents are able to collude in all cases …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851346

Forward induction and the excess capacity puzzle: An experimental investigation

Brandts, Jordi; Cabrales, Antonio; Charness, Gary - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2003

entry into markets, there is little empirical evidence that incumbent firms effectively behave in this way. Bagwell and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547333

Implementation of the Ordinal Shapley Value for a Three-agent Economy

Pérez-Castrillo, David; Wettstein, David - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2005

We propose a simple mechanism that implements the Ordinal Shapley Value (Prez-Castrillo and Wettstein [2005]) for economies with three or less agents.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547131

Aversion to Inequality and Segregating Equilibria

Cabrales, Antonio; Calvó-Armengol, Antoni - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2005

This paper shows that models where preferences of individuals depend not only on their allocations, but also on the well-being of other persons, can produce both large and testable effects. We study the allocation of workers with heterogeneous productivities to firms. We show that even small...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547201

Smooth Multibidding Mechanisms

Pérez-Castrillo, David; Quérou, Nicolas - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2010

We propose a smooth multibidding mechanism for environments where a group of agents have to choose one out of several projects (possibly with the help of a social planner). Our proposal is related to the multibidding mechanism (Prez-Castrillo and Wettstein, 2002) but it is smoother in the sense...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547426

Innovation Contests

Pérez-Castrillo, David; Wettstein, David - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2012

We study innovation contests with asymmetric information and identical contestants, where contestants’ efforts and innate abilities generate inventions of varying qualities. The designer offers a reward to the contestant achieving the highest quality and receives the revenue generated by the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851325

The Condominium Problem; Auctions for Substitutes

Burguet, Roberto - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2003

oral, ascending auctions for the right to choose are efficient. This is a common type of auction used for the sale of real …. This is also a common feature of auctions for the sale of real estate. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547200

Optimal procurement auction for a buyer with downward sloping demand: more simple economics

Burguet, Roberto - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2004

A buyer with downward sloping demand faces a number of unit supply sellers. The paper characterizes optimal auctions in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547383

Ignorance Promotes Competition: an Auction Model with Endogenous Private Valuations

Ganuza, Juan-José - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2003

We study a situation in which an auctioneer wishes to sell an object to one of N risk-neutral bidders with heterogeneous preferences. The auctioneer does not know bidders' preferences but has private information about the characteristics of the object, and must decide how much information to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547390

On Information and Competition in Private Value Auctions

Ganuza, Juan José; Penalva, José - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2005

private value auctions. We use a general notion of informativeness which allows us to compare the efficient with the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547489