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Not Just Like Starting Over: Leadership and Revivification of Cooperation in Groups

Brandts, Jordi; Rott, Christina; Solà, Carles - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2015

We conduct a laboratory experiment to study how, after a history of decay, cooperation in a repeated voluntary … initial increase of cooperation, but to a subsequent new decay. Motivated by cooperation decay in organizations we study the … potential of three interventions of triggering higher and sustained cooperation, which take place at the same time as a restart …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011261233

Rhetoric and Analogies

Aragonès, Enriqueta; Gilboa, Itzhak; Postlewaite, Andrew; … - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2013

The art of rhetoric may be defined as changing other people’s minds (opinions, beliefs) without providing them new information. One technique heavily used by rhetoric employs analogies. Using analogies, one may draw the listener’s attention to similarities between cases and to re-organize...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851430

Discrete Devaluations and Multiple Equilibria in a First Generation Model of Currency Crises

Broner, Fernando A - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2006

The rst generation models of currency crises have often been criticized because they predict that, in the absence of very large triggering shocks, currency attacks should be predictable and lead to small devaluations. This paper shows that these features of rst generation models are not robust...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547109

A Theory of Information Flows

Jeon, Doh-Shin - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2003

Obtaining information about changes in market conditions is vital for the survival of the firms operating in a changing environment. In this paper, we offer a theory of information flows in a setting in which the principal faces a project choice and needs to induce the agent, who is responsible...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547251

Discrete Devaluations and Multiple Equilibria in a First Generation Model of Currency Crises

Broner, Fernando A. - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2004

The first generation models of currency crises have often been criticized because they predict that, in the absence of very large triggering shocks, currency attacks should be predictable and lead to small devaluations. This paper shows that these features of first generation models are not...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547265

Relying on the Agent in Charge of Production for Project Evaluation

Jeon, Doh-Shin - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2006

I study the optimal project choice when the principal relies on the agent in charge of production for project evaluation. The principal has to choose between a safe project generating a fixed revenue and a risky project generating an uncertain revenue. The agent has private information about the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547373

Portable Alphas from Pension Mispricing

Franzoni, Francesco; Marin, José M. - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2005

We introduce a new dynamic trading strategy based on the systematic mispricing of U.S. companies sponsoring Defined Benefit pension plans. This portfolio produces an average return of 1.51% monthly between 1989 and 2004, with a Sharpe Ratio of 0.26. The returns of the strategy are not explained...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547435

Mechanism Design under Collusion and Uniform Transfers

Jeon, Doh-Shin - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2003

In this paper, we study mechanism design under collusion and uniform transfers focusing on the transaction costs in coalition formation created by asymmetric information among agents. We are particularly interested in the interaction between incompleteness of contracts and collusion: in our...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010547534

Growth, Selection and Appropriate Contracts

Bonfiglioli, Alessandra; Gancia, Gino - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2012

We study a dynamic model where growth requires both long-term investment and the selection of talented managers. When ability is not ex-ante observable and contracts are incomplete, managerial selection imposes a cost, as managers facing the risk of being replaced tend to choose a sub-optimally...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010734223

Predestination and the Protestant Ethic

Alaoui, Larbi; Sandroni, Alvaro - Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) - 2013

This paper shows an equivalence result between the utility functions of secular agents who abide by a moral obligation to accumulate wealth and those of religious agents who believe that salvation is immutable and preordained by God. This result formalizes Weber's renowned thesis on the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010618057